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'Id SeTsfoT } COMMITTEE PRINT
THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTHERN
Senator Charles H. Percy
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
STUDY MISSION TO SOUTHERN AFRICA CONDUCTED
BETWEEN APRIL 13 AND APRIL 25, 1976
the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
-287 WASHINGTON : 1976
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN SPARKMAN, Alabama, Chairman
MIKE MANSFIELD, Montana
FRANK CHURCH, Idaho
STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri
CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island
GALE W. McGEE, Wyoming
GEORGE S. McGOVERN, South Dakota
HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, Minnesota
DICK CLARK, Iowa
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
CLIFFORD P. CASE, New Jersey
JACOB K. JAYITS, New York
HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania
JAMES B. PEARSON, Kansas
CHARLES H. PERCY, Illinois
ROBERT P. GRIFFIN, Michigan
Pat M. Holt, Chief of Staff
Arthur M. Kuhl, Chief Clerk
Letter of transmittal v
1. Summary 1
2. Tanzania 5
3. Zambia 7
4. Mozambique 9
5. Namibia 11
C>. South Africa 13
7. Botswana 18
8. Conclusions 19
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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
June 24, 1976?
Hon. John Sparkman,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations;
U.S. Senate, Washington, B.C.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Enclosed herewith is the report of a study
mission I made to Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, Namibia, South
Africa, and Botswana during the Senate Easter recess, April 13 to 25.
I sought answers to the following questions: (1) What new or changing
circumstances warrant major U.S. concern in southern Africa? (2)
How shall we define the U.S. interest in that region? (3) Does our
economic stake in South Africa — and in developing Africa — provide
us with useful political influence? (4) What do the people of southern
Africa want from us? And, finally, (5) Can we as a Nation deliver an
I met with President Nyerere of Tanzania, President Kaunda of
Zambia, President Machel of Mozambique, Vice President Masire of
Botswana, and Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa, and scores of
other official and nonofficial residents of these countries. We were
very hospitably received by each of the host governments, and we
concluded that there is a substantial reservoir of good will for the
United States in the whole region.
I was accompanied by my wife Loraine Percy (at our expense) and
by Dr. Peter A. Poole of my staff. Except as otherwise noted in the
report, all three of us took part in each of the meetings. In some
cases, the timeliness of the meetings caused us to report directly on
them by State Department cable. In each of the countries visited, we
received excellent cooperation from the American Ambassador and
his staff, for which it is a pleasure to acknowledge our deep
appreciation. We also gratefully acknowledge the assistance of the
State Department's Bureau of African Affairs.
I believe that we Americans have much to offer — and much to gain —
by strengthening our ties with Africa. The rediscovery of this fact —
the veritable rediscovery of a major continent — is a stimulating ad-
venture of the mind and spirit. I hope, through this report, to com-
municate to the committee and to other readers some of the great
potential that all of us felt during our recent visit.
Charles H. Percy,
THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTHERN AFRICA
The United States is rediscovering Africa, after more than a decade
of relative indifference by senior officials, Congress, the press, and the
American public. To some people, this reawakening of our country's
interest in a vast continent — rich in every kind of potential but beset
also by major problems — seems a meddlesome diversion from our real
interests as a nation.
I disagree. I believe, and the Administration believes, that we have
permanent and substantial interests in Africa. We played a leading role
in supporting decolonization of the northern half of the continent. We
have invested some $6 billion in foreign aid and $6 billion in private
funds in Africa. It is obvious that Africa and North America will
become more interdependent by the end of this century. It is to be
regretted that it took a civil war in Angola — and the intervention
of Soviet advisers and Cuban and South African troops — to reawaken
us to these facts.
During the Senate's Easter recess, I made a study tour of southern
Africa on behalf of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and its
African Subcommittee. I was accompanied and assisted by Peter A.
Poole, of my staff and by Mrs. Percy. The main questions to which
I wanted to find answers were: (1) What new or changing circum-
stances warrant major U.S. concern in this region? (2) How shall we
define the U.S. interest in southern Africa? (3) Does our economic
stake in South Africa — and in developing Africa — provide us with
useful political influence? (4) What do the people of southern Africa
want from us? And finally; (5) Can we deliver an effective response?
The Rhodesia crisis
All signs point to escalating guerrilla warfare and foreign military
intervention in Rhodesia— and this could well become a much more
serious war than the one that recently ended in Angola. This rising
danger to regional and world peace stems from Ian Smith's refusal to
agree to a timetable for transition to majority rule proposed by British
Prime Minister Callaghan — and the collapse of talks between Ian
Smith and the moderate black Rhodesian leader, Joshua Nkomo.
While refusing to extend the suffrage to any substantial number of
black people, Ian Smith appointed four tribal chiefs to his cabinet and
agreed to consider a government commission report on discrimination.
If he had taken these steps several years ago, they might have been
viewed as responsive by many black Rhodesians and by other black
African leaders. In the present context, they clearly are not. Even
Xkomo, the most moderate black nationalist leader, described the
appointment of the four chiefs as no progress at all. He said that
Rhodesian blacks insist on the right to choose their leaders. Moreover,
African leaders have pointed out that Ian Smith's gestures were
accompanied by the creation of special courts to try accused terrorists,
a move that no one viewed as conciliatory.
The U.S. interest
Thus, from the standpoint of U.S. interest, the most immediate
requirement in southern Africa is to encourage rapid progress toward a
legal constitutional framework, guaranteeing basic political rights and
social justice to all Rhodesians, black and white. Along with every
other country concerned in the area (including South Africa), we see
this as the only alternative to tragic racial violence and foreign military
The U.S. interest in Namibia is very similar. However, there is at
least a potentially useful framework for negotiations there in the form
of a constitutional conference. This urgently needs to be expanded,
preferably under UN supervision, to include the main political move-
ments and parties in Namibia. The Republic of South Africa should
also cease its efforts to carve out separate ethnic homelands in Namibia
and treat the territory as one country. Moreover, it should agree to a
public timetable for Namibia's rapid transition to full independence
under majority rule.
The leaders of South Africa and developing Africa have begun to
realize that they must greatly expand their economic links with each
other in order to attain their basic economic goals. They have no
other rational alternative. However, better relations between South
Africa and developing Africa depend on rapid and far-reaching im-
provement of the situation of black people in the Republic.
While there has been some lessening of pett} T apartheid (segrega-
tion) — mainly for economic reasons — the South African Government
has intensified its pursuit of separate development for each racial or
ethnic group. Under this extraordinary concept, blacks who com-
prise nearly 80 percent of the population are forced to become citizens
of so-called homelands (comparable to our Indian reservations) that
comprise only 13 percent of the land. To earn a subsistence, most
blacks must find jobs in the white areas, which include the most de-
veloped urban and rural two-thirds of South Africa. In these areas,
black South Africans have virtually no rights as human beings under
the country's laws.
U.S. economic role in South Africa
The United States is one of the major investors in South Africa,
with over 350 U.S. firms represented there. The book value of U.S.
private assets (in 1974, the latest figures available) was $1.5 billion,
or 16 percent of all foreign investment in the country. Estimates of the
real value of U.S. assets today range up to $5 billion. This level has
been reached in spite of a total embargo on U.S. military aid and arms
sales to South Africa, Only limited Export-Import Bank facilities are
available for trade with South Africa, and direct loans are prohibited.
(The U.S. Government discourages American firms from investing in
Namibia and forbids them to invest in Rhodesia.)
American and other business leaders whom I met in South Africa
generally acknowledged their responsibility to provide expanded op-
portunities for black South Africans. The country desperately needs a
large inflow of foreign investment to recover from the worldwide
recession and to resume past levels of growth. Economic expansion is
the only mechanism that can produce greater social justice for the
Although U.S. firms have been among the more progressive em-
ployers in South Africa, they can do far better, and they must — be-
cause the pent-up pressures are highly explosive. For example, no
black labor unions have yet been recognized as official bargaining
agents. Blacks have been the main victims of layoffs and dwindling
opportunities for advancement caused by the recession, which has
reversed some of their hard-won economic gains. However, low-
income whites have also been squeezed by inflation, threats of lay-
offs, and the pressure of the black majority from below.
Under these circumstances, an embargo on further U.S. invest-
ment in South Africa or a withdrawal of U.S. assets could, quite
possibly, produce a violent upheaval. At the very least, a ban on
investment would aggravate the plight of the black majority without
offering these people any hope for constructive change.
Thus, I do not believe the answer lies in negative economic pressure
on South Africa. I believe that American investment can play a useful
role in expanding the pie and in seeing that it is more fairly divided.
However, it would be unrealistic to look on U.S. investment as a means
of transforming South African society overnight. Rapid social change
can only come through a drastic change in attitude by the dominant
white minority, the black majority, or both groups. The end of white
minority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia may precipitate new attitudes
in the Republic.
The best use of our economic influence in Africa is that which
Secretary Kissinger outlined during his recent tour: stronger pressure
for positive social change in South Africa, coupled with increased
public investment to help the developing nations of the continent
become self-supporting. We have strong incentives to carry out
such a policy. Africa has large reserves of raw materials on which we
will increasingly depend. Rising living standards in Africa mean new
markets for U.S. goods. And, as alread}^ noted, the emerging inter-
dependence of the states of Southern Africa should offer some incen-
tives for better race relations within national borders.
What do the Africans want from us?
In spite of a decade of so-called benign neglect, we found that black
and white African leaders believed us capable of playing a construc-
tive role in their region. In fact, there may be a danger that both
groups will tend to credit us with powers we do not have.
Black leaders whom we talked with included President Nyerere of
Tanzania, President Kaunda of Zambia, President Machel of Mozam-
bique, Vice President Masire of Botswana and leaders and representa-
tives of the main liberation movements of Rhodesia and Namibia. All
of them wanted, first, a clear and unequivocal assurance that we will
not intervene to save Ian Smith's regime if his policies provoke a major
war and foreign intervention. Second, some positive indication of U.S.
moral support (not arms) for the national liberation movements in
Rhodesia and Namibia. The fact that Secretary Kissinger himself
provided assurances on these points, in his speech at Lusaka, made the
words doubly welcome. Previously, too many African leaders had
seen the U.S. Government as unable to focus on Africa and "ob-
VTe talked with white leaders in South Africa and Namibia and with
the Rhodesian representatives in Capetown. Their requests were not
completely irreconcilable with those made by the black leaders.
(Both groups have some sense of the possible range of U.S. positions.)
First, the white leaders wanted the most realistic assessment we could
give them of the kinds of pressures America was likely to exert on
behalf of majority rule. Second, they wanted us to be more conscious
of their point of view. I think, in fact, we Americans tend to be blinded
by our own preconceived notions when we look at white-ruled southern
Africa. The apparent similarity to our own situation (which tends
to make us passionately pro or con) is often deceiving. Having said
this, however, I think we have no choice but to forcefully remind the
white minority in southern Africa that time is not on their side.
It should not be too surprising that realistic Africans, black and
white, share some of the same concerns about the future. For example,
they each made it clear to me that they want "no more Angolas" —
meaning no more foreign military intervention in Africa. This view
seems to extend right across the political spectrum in Africa — and I
was reminded of our own consensus on "no more Vietnams."
Much of southern Africa has been relatively isolated from contacts
with the rest of the world. We found that many Africans hunger for
an end to this isolation. Finally, many people we talked with expi
the hope that American interest in Africa will cease to be a fluctuating
affair, depending mainly on our perception of the ''Communist threat."
They would like us to show a more constant concern for African
culture, African problems, and African goals. If our sole preoccupation
is to be great power rivalries, many Africans would find it the lesser
evil to be ignored.
Can we deliver?
Secretan- Kissinger's address at Lusaka responded to many of the
most deeply felt priorities of the African people. Some aspects of his
program require Congressional enactment; of these points, some are of
great importance to Africans and some are not. For example, our
promised support of states that have closed their borders with Rhodesia
is valued as a symbol and as a very practical contribution to the survi-
val of these countries. On the other hand, we were somewhat surprised
to find that repeal of the Byrd amendment (allowing U.S. chrome
imports from Rhodesia in violation of U.N. -auctions) is now seen by
Africans as having less practical than symbolic significance. Rhodesia
is nearly isolated, economically, and is not recognized diplomatically
by a single nation. Rhodesia's independence will only be recognized
a- legal by Great Britain, still regarded as sovereign by most nations,
when Salisbury complies with the basic standards of social justice
required by Prime Minister Callaghan.
We found that American officials in Africa share the view of all
executive branch agencies and departments in Washington: We can
readily turn to South Africa as an alternative source of supply for the
chrome ore and ferrochrome we buy from Rhodesia; so we do not
need to buv more chrome from Russia if we buv less from Rhodesia.
Our stockpiles are adequate for several years of conventional war
needs. Thus, there simply is no strategic argument for ignoring our
own vote in favor of the U.N. embargo. On the contrary, with the
end of white minority rule in Rhodesia now in sight, counsels of self-
interest would seem to point toward compliance with the U.N.
We were, of course, repeatedly asked during our trip how hard either
a Democratic-controlled Congress or a Republican-controlled White
House may be prepared to work, in an election year, to broaden the
Nation's understanding of our important foreign policy interests in
Africa. I answered that I frankly do not see how those who favor an
enlightened and forward-looking American policy could gain the
slightest political advantage by avoiding this compelling task.
We were also questioned by many thoughtful Africans about how
we view the long-term role of America in the future of their continent.
I think there is no doubt that our economic relations will become much
more intensive. Even if this were not so, we are bound, as Secretary
Kissinger has said, by the cultural heritage of 23 million Americans,
and by the moral sympathy of over 200 million Americans. In close
partnership with our European allies, we must respond vigorously to
the pressing needs of developing Africa — and urge the white South
Africans to seek a more humane and rational relationship with the
black majorit}^ among whom they live. In this way, we may help to
bridge the huge economic, social, and political gap that exists between
white-ruled South Africa and the developing states on the continent.
Visiting Dar es Salaam at the outset was important because one of
my main objectives was to learn how the group of African leaders
known as the "frontline" Presidents assess the situation in Rhodesia
and Namibia. These four leaders are: President Nyerere of Tanzania,
President Kaunda of Zambia, President Machel of Mozambique, and
President Khama of Botswana.
At one time, Tanzania, was the main center of liberation movements
in eastern and southern Africa. Now, the black Rhodesian and Nami-
bian political leaders are based mainly in Zambia. Guerrilla units
training for the liberation of Rhodesia are mainly in Mozambique,
and there are some Namibian guerrilla units based in Angola. We met
with Col. Hashim Mbita and other leaders of the liaison group estab-
lished in Dar es Salaam by the Organization of African Unity to chan-
nel support from the OAU to specific liberation movements. The
individuals we spoke with indicated that they spend much of their time
now traveling to the neighboring countries of Zambia, Mozambique,
and occasionally Rhodesia, where guerrilla operations have been
gradually increasing in intensity.
Although the focus of the liberation movements has shifted south,
President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania remains perhaps the most
influential leader in all of black Africa. His prestige is enhanced by his
concept of the Ujamaa (familyhood) village and his extraordinary grasp
of foreign affairs. Our meeting with President Nyerere took place the
night of April 16. U.S. Ambassador James Spain attended, as did the
Tanzanian Foreign Minister.
President Xyerere stated at the outset his view that South Africa's
racist policies constitute the main long-term problem in the region. He
said he thought the United States could play a constructive role in
helping to resolve this problem. He gave Prime Minister Vorster
credit, however, for seeking to improve relations with his non white
neighbors and for having tried to bring about a political solution in
Rhodesia. But President Xyerere said the rulers of South Africa are
still not thinking in terms of change in their own country — only of
defending the existing system. He expressed the hope that America
could influence them on this subject before it proved too late. If South
Africa supports Ian Smith's regime, Xyerere predicted, the fighting in
Rhodesia would go on for a long time. The longer the fighting lasts,
he said, the less acceptable to South Africa will the resulting govern-
Turning to the situation in Xamibia, President Xyerere said that if
South Africa acts now, it can have an independent Xamibia whose
stability could be influenced by the United Nations. If Pretoria con-
tinues to resist that outcome, he said, the result will be a "government
of guns." President Xyerere also urged us to visit Mozambique and
observe for ourselves that its government is independent and national-
ist, not controlled by the Soviets or the Chinese.
I told President Xyerere that the United States was committed to
the aim of majority rule in southern Africa. I said there was almost no
sentiment in America in favor of U.S. military intervention in the
region or U.S. military aid to the liberation movements. I urged that
Xyerere and his colleagues, the other frontline Presidents, continue
to explore every possibility for a peaceful settlement. I pointed out that
the United States respects Tanzania's right to choose its own friends.
I suggested closer contacts between our newly appointed Ambassador
to the United Xations, Governor William Scranton, and Tanzania's
Ambassador Salim (with whom we met briefly during a visit to
Zanzibar). We discussed the importance of Secretary Kissinger's
African tour, which would bring him to Tanzania in less than two
President Xyerere is a man of great intellect, with a warm and
magnetic personality. Much of his time is spent traveling from village
to village in remote parts of his country, encouraging local officials
to improve the standard of living of this sparsely settled, resource-
poor country. X'yerere's concept of development emphasizes agri-
cultural production and the creation of village-level services. Even
this modest and pragmatic approach calls for far more capital invest-
ment than Tanzania can provide on its own. Foreign aid is therefore
received from many countries, of which Sweden and Communist
China have had the greatest political impact.
The United States has provided about $10 million a year in recent
years, mainly for various forms of agricultural development. In addi-
tion, we have provided varying amounts of Public Law 480 food aid.
I had the occasion to discuss with the Finance Minister several
bilateral economic issues that have clouded United States-Tanzanian
relations in the past. Reportedly, some progress was made toward
resolving these issues as a result of the Secretary's visit.
United States private investment in Tanzania is concentrated in two
petroleum supply companies, with a book value of under $5 million.
Tanzanian leaders have clearly indicated a desire for increased for-
eign and particularly U.S. investment. However, it would have to
be concentrated in very specific areas (mainly agriculture) to support
the country's development plan. This has not so far attracted a great
deal of U.S. investor interest. Recently, the Government has been
seeking to promote tourism by developing seaside resort hotels as well
as the country's magnificent game parks. There may be opportunities
for cooperative U.S. investment in these areas.
There are some 1,450 nonofficial Americans resident in Tanzania,
including a considerable number of Christian missionaries. The official
American community is composed of about 60 officials, half of them
AID contract employees. This is not an unduly large American mis-
sion, considering the size of the U.S. aid program there. We were
pleased to note the high quality of U.S. personnel assigned to Tan-
zania and their excellent morale.
The U.S. Consulate on Zanzibar (one of our oldest diplomatic posts
in the world) is run by two young and able Foreign Service officers,
David Halsted and Michael Cutter. Zanzibar and Tanganyika formed
the United Republic of Tanzania in 1963. There is no indication
today of the communal tension and violence that marked the early
years of independence. Zanzibar now enjoys tranquility and the rule
of law. There is a substantial foreign trade surplus and many indica-
tions of relative prosperity, including new factories, hotels, a Japanese
amusement park, and much public construction. Although Zanzibar
has considerable administrative autonomy within Tanzania, the is-
land's official Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) is in the process of merging
with President Nyerere's Tanzania Africa National Union (TANU).
On Easter Sunday morning, we met with President Kenneth
Kaunda in the capital city of Lusaka after attending a service at
the Anglican Cathedral. This was filled to capacity, and the congre-
gation was about evenly divided between black and white families,
with a sprinkling of Asians; there was the usual Easter morning
enthusiasm from the many children present, some for baptism.
This setting was appropriate for our meeting with Dr. Kaunda, a
devout Christian leader. His moral principles have been challenged
time and again since he led his young nation to independence in 1964.
Zambia's support of the worldwide economic boycott of Rhodesia
costs the country some $100 million a year. Dr. Kaunda has clearly
indicated that he prefers negotiation to war, having met with both
Prime Minister Vorster and Ian Smith to try to resolve the impasse
in Rhodesia. However, along with the other frontline presidents
(Nyerere, Machel, and Khama), he has finally adopted the position
that Smith's stalling and intransigence has left Rhodesian nationalists
no other course but to fight for their rights.
President Kaunda opposed one-party dominance by the Marxist
MPLA in Angola, and he only decided to recognize President Neto's
government a few da}s before our visit. During the Easter weekend,
he was preparing for a state visit to Mozambique, a major event for
We met with President Kaunda for over an hour at Government
House. Present during our meeting were Ambassador Jean Wilkowski,
Foreign Minister Banda, and the President's senior political advisers.
President Kaunda stressed his hope that all nations would appty
concerted pressure to bring Ian Smith to the negotiating table. He
pointed out that Ian Smith had rejected the most persistent efforts by
the British Government, the four frontline Presidents, and the black
Rhodesians to reach a political settlement. He urged that the United
States put aside its "obsession with communism" and join in the
policy of concerted pressure. In regard to Namibia, Dr. Kaunda
claimed that Prime Minister Vorster could greatly improve the chances
of a nonviolent political solution by setting a date now for Namibia's
Dr. Kaunda has a remarkable presence. He is relaxed in spite of
the conflicting pressures he must bear. Yet one can sense a ver\- human
impatience. In spite of his many outspoken warnings — to the world in
general and to the United States in particular — he fears that the
problems of southern Africa have been largely ignored until now when
the region is on the brink of disaster. (Excerpts from his speech during
Secretary Kissinger's visit to Lusaka are included in the Appendix.)
During our two-day visit to Lusaka, we also met with Bishop
Muzorewa, who has long been regarded as the most widely supported
black political leader in Rhodesia. His main theme was that Ian
Smith's stubborness left black Rhodesians no alternative except
armed struggle. He also dwelt on the failure of America for the last
ten years to heed his many warnings of trouble in Rhodesia. He indi-
cated that repeal of the Byrd amendment would be a symbol of
America's present support for majority rule. He said that young
Rhodesians are prepared to sacrifice their lives for freedom and that
they are gaining confidence as guerrilla fighters; he said they were not
fighting against a race but against a racist system. Finally when
asked if a new group of leaders had begun to appear in the gueirilla
training camps, Muzorewa claimed it was "premature" to make such a
I told Bishop Muzorewa that I believe the American people support
the aim of majority rule but want to see it come without violence.
red that a brief and just struggle was more humane than a
prolonged one with many casualties.
We also met with four officials of the Institute of Namibia in Lusaka.
This organization is supported by the United Nations, and its aim is
to train the future leaders of an independent Namibia. The four able
young men whom we met had all attended universities in the United
State-. They were leaders of the Southwest African Peoples Organiza-
tion (SWAPO), a liberation movement that has widespread interna-
tional support from nations that span the whole range of ideologi •-.
These representatives -aid they hoped to carry out the liberation of
their country without violence, and they indicated their gratitude for
increasing U.S. sympathy for their position at the United Nations
and their hope that we would help support the training program of
amibia Institute. We found them to be politically sophisticated
and well informed about current events in the United State-.
rresent, the United States has no economic aid program in
Zambia. A $6 million U.S. loan was provided in 197/! as a form of
aid when Zambia closed it^ border with Rhodesia. During his
visit to Lusaka, Secretary Kissinger stated publicly that the United
States intends to respond to Zambia's current financial situation.
The Zambian Government seeks to attract Western private invest-
ment, and the estimated book value of investments by U.S. firms,
primarily in minerals extraction, is $114 million.
The Zambian Government limits to 15 the official complement of
each foreign embassy. (This practice would surely commend itself
to many American ambassadors, who so often find their embassies
cluttered with large numbers of non-State Department personnel.)
In fact, Embassy Lusaka was understaffed at the time of our visit,
and everyone was extremely busy with preparations for the Secre-
tary's visit, which followed ours by only 8 days. We were thus all the
more grateful for the excellent program they provided for us on an
Our visit to Mozambique was brief, but it was interesting to see
firsthand the transition through which this former Portuguese colom r
is passing. Profound changes have taken place in Mozambique since
the April 1974 overthrow of the Caetano government in Lisbon — by
Portuguese Army Reserve officers who had become disillusioned by
their country's endless colonial wars in Africa. Within months, the
new Portuguese rulers began the process of decolonization. Agreement
was reached fairly rapidly in the case of Mozambique and also in
Guinea Bissau and the Cape Verde Islands. These countries were
spared some of the more serious military and political problems that
occurred in Angola. Lisbon recognized FRELIMO (rront for the
Liberation of Mozambique) as the dominant political force in Mozam-
bique, and the county achieved full independence in June 1975.
However, independence has brought a host of problems; these
have been magnified by the exodus of hundreds of thousands of Portu-
guese residents, including most of the professional and managerial
5S. The main reason for their departure was uncertainty about the
regime's ability to maintain security and to operate the basic
economic and social services which it controls. By the time of our visit,
only about 20,000 Portuguese, man}' of them teachers, remained in the
try; most of these were considered likely to leave on completion
of their contracts in the summer of 1976.
A great deal of economic development took place in the capital
city of Maputo — former Lorenco Marques — during the final decade
of colonial rule. It is said that the FRELIMO guerrillas were surprised
when they finally saw the capital after spending years in the jungle.
Today on first sight, the city seems well cared for and prospe
Cars jam the avenues at rush hours, there are many well-dressed
pedestrians, and at night the neon-lit shops and restaurants lend an
air of normalcy. The gracious Polano Hotel on the Indian Ocean is well
run and full of newh^-arrived diplomats. However, many are there
because of the endless bureaucratic obstacles to renting a house.
Hundreds of homes w ere abandoned by former Portuguese resident- —
and taken over by the State two months later. Many of them still
remain vacant. Construction has stopped on high-rise office buildings
that stand with their scaffoldings, two-thirds complete. The i -
tribution of food and other essentials is extremely disrupted. Medical
services have greatly diminished because of the departure of most
Portuguese doctors and nurses, and long waiting lines are the order of
In spite of the country's economic stagnation, the government has
recently decided to close its border to Rhodesia, at an estimated cost
of some $200 million per year. Mozambique's main links with the
outside world are its fine port and its railway line to South Africa,
both of which are still being operated with the help of South African
At the time of our visit, the small Foreign Ministry staff was
heavily burdened with the task of establishing formal diplomatic tics
with dozens of nations and preparing for a series of state visits by
African leaders. President Kaunda arrived on the day of our depar-
ture; almost the entire government was engaged in preparing for his
visit. Streets were being lined with flags and banners. At the airport,
a vast crowd of soldiers, dancers, musicians, uniformed schoolchildren,
and other spectators waited patiently for the great event.
During our one-hour meeting with President Machel, we found him
relaxed and extremely cordial. He spoke to us in Portuguese, through
an interpreter, and seemed anxious to make himself clearly under-
stood. He declared that the struggle in Rhodesia is not a racist struggle
of black against white but a true liberation struggle of an oppressed
people seeking fundamental human rights and dignity. He said that
the effort was directed against the illegal regime of Ian Smith and not
against innocent men, women, and children.
When I asked him what his government expected from the United
States, President Machel answered by saying what he felt the United
States should not do. For example, he said he does not want America
to try to back one group or leader in the Rhodesian liberation move-
ment against another. He said the leadership of the movement should
be left to the black Rhodesians. If it were, he believed that leaders
would emerge from those engaged in the armed struggle, as he claims
they did in Mozambique.
Turning to Angola, President Machel said the only truly nationalist
political movement in the country was the MPLA (Popular Move-
ment for the Liberation of Angola). He described the National Front
for the Liberation of Angola (FXLA) as tribal, regional, and racist
and said its headquarters were outside Angola. And he claimed that
UNITA was created by the Portuguese to protect their interests.
Despite his preference for the MPLA, Machel told us he had supported
national reconciliation in Angola until South African forces inter-
vened. With a touch of irony, he pointed out that South Africa's
intervention led to the rapid victory of the MPLA and its recognition
by all of Africa as the Government of Angola. Had South Africa
stayed out of the war, Machel said, it might still be going on, and no
more than fifteen African States would have recognized the MPLA.
On U.S. -Mozambique relations, President Machel said he was more
interested in our current and future policies than in reviewing the
past. He said he believes that Americans in general want to see south-
ern Africa free. In what may have been an oblique reference to Soviet
and Cuban involvement in Africa, he emphasized that Mozambique
had won its independence without foreign intervention. He said that
Mozambique is beholden to no one, and will continue to conduct its
affairs independent of outside influence. (In May, President Machel
made a long-deferred visit to Moscow, having already made the
rounds of other Socialist capitals: new economic and military aid
agreement- were signed by Machel in the U-S.S.R.
In ray remarks to President Machel. I said that I agreed completely
that it was not in the interest of any nation to exchange one form of
dependence for another. I foresaw increased emphasis on Africa in
U.S. policy, a- -ienified by Secretary Kissinger's forthcoming visit.
During the Secretary'- African tour. President Machel released two
American missionaries who had been in prison. This seems to indicate
that he welcomes the new U.S. interest in southern Africa. However,
according to press reports, a considerable number of Africans and
Europeans — including one American — are still being held in prison
without charges in Mozambique.
On April 20, we flew to Windhoek, the administrative capital of
Namibia, via Johannesburg. South Africa has administered Namibia
since taking control of the territory in Wotld War I. The name
Namiba was given to the country by the United Nations General
Assembly in 196^. South Africa ha- refused to recognize a long series of
United Nations and World Court rulings that it has no right to ad-
ministei Namibia: most of these rulings have been supported by the
In spite of Pretoria'> effort- to put its stamp on Namibia, history
has given the territory and its people a distinctive charactei which is
difficult to erase. In the case of South Africa. Euiopean settlement
dates from the 1600'-. and preceded black African settlement. In
Namibia, on the other hand, there were no important European
colonies until the Germans arrived in the late ISOO's. The Ovanibc-:-
and Herrero-. the two largest tribes, emigrated south into Namibia
several generations earlier. Neither the Germans nor the later South
African rulers of Namibia did much to promote the welfare of the
black inhabitants of the country. But it was only after War War II
that Pretoria began to burden them heavily with apartheid (segrega-
tion) laws and with the policy of assigning blacks to ethnic "home-
lands. " Thus, black people, who outnumber white- by almost 9 to 1
m Namibia (a much higher ratio than in South Africa), seem even
more inclined to resist these racist policies than South African black-.
During our visit we were able to encounter a broad spectrum of
of political opinion. The views expressed to us ranged all the way
from rigid support of white supremacy to the attitude that the "first
stage" of majority rule should be a dictatorship. In between these
extreme position-, we encountered a somewhat encouraging degree
of political sophistication and flexibility. However, there i- very
little communication between leaders of the white power structure
and representatives of the major parties — though many people on
both side- seem to share the objectives of an early, nonviolent transi-
tion to independence with some form of majority rule and protection
of basic rights of all peoples.
♦South Africans still refer to it as "South West Africa." A more detailed history of
Namibia and a summary of the South African Governments position are in the Appendix
to this report.
7S-2S7— 76 3
A constitutional conference has been organized by the South African
Government. If it is to serve as a plausible framework for shaping
Namibia's future, it urgently needs to be broadened to include the
main political parties. Of these, SWAPO (South West African Peoples
Organization) is undoubtedly the most important. However, several
others also have a substantial following. These include SWANU
(South West African National Union), which is mainly drawn from
the Herrero tribe, and the Federal Part}* — membership limited to
whites, but more moderate than the Nationalist Party.
At present, membership in the constitutional conference is in effect
limited to representatives of various ethnic groups. Most of these
representatives have given little evidence of being independent
spokesmen of the population; some are illiterate, and most have had
no previous political experience. Nevertheless, the conference has
voted to reject some forms of segregation and has adopted the principle
of equal pay for equal work.
In April 1976, there were signs that the conference might adopt a
constitution that had just been presented by Chief Kapuuo, a well-
educated and respected Herrero leader, with whom we met. He
described his constitution as providing for a bicameral legislature,
with one house composed of representatives from the north, where
the main ethnic ■■homelands" are located, and one from the central
and southern areas, which contain the large towns and white-run
farms and mining enterprises. It was assumed that the Ovambo
tribe, comprising about half the population of roughly one million,
would control the '-northern house," while the Herrero and more
urbanized tribes might control the "southern house." Since laws could
only be enacted by consensus between the two houses, the Ovambos'
numerical and political strength might be balanced by that of more
conservative groups in the southern region.
Such a constitutional arrangement would not conflict with the fore-
cast of Namibia's future given by Foreign Minister Muller at Stellen-
bosch University on April 1, 1976. Excerpts from this important
statement, which coincide closely with remarks that Prime Minister
Vorster made to me, are included in the Appendix of this report.
We were able to meet with key officials of the South African
Government administration in Namibia, including a number of
black people who have accepted positions of some responsibility in
the Ovambo ' 'homeland", which I visited on Apiil 21. (According to
press reports in May, a half-mile section of Ovamboland, bordering
on Angola, has been evacuated by the South African Government in
an attempt to counter the increasing terrorism.) We also met a number
of delegates to the constitutional conference, though it was not in
session during our visit.
Most of our contacts with representatives and supporters of the
various political parties operating inside Namibia were arranged for
us'bv the American Embassy in Pretoria. In a few instances, individ-
uals learned of our visit and contacted us on their own initiative —
and in violation of the apartheid laws.
\o U.S. officials are stationed in Namibia, and the U.S. Govern-
ment actively discourages U.S. investment in the territory. In order
m emphasize the fact that it regards South Africa's presence in
Namibia as illegal, the U.S. Government has severely restricted travel
to Namibia of officials of the executive branch. No member of the
U.S. Senate had heretofore visited Namibia to my knowledge or that
of the U.S. Embassy in South Africa. The only U.S. official currently
stationed in South Africa who has regularly visited Namibia is a
junior officer of the American Embassy in Pretoria, Mr. Richard
Tierney, who accompanied us on our trip, and whom we found to
be an extremely knowledgeable and capable FSO.
The purpose of the U.S. Government's policy of severely limiting
official contact with Namibia is to avoid de facto recognition of
South Africa's role in the territory. I believe, however, that the
United States has only minimized the role that it might have played
in recent years in helping to encourage a satisfactory political solution
in Namibia. Thus, I believe this policy of the United States should
be changed so as to enable us to play a more active role in helping
to bring about a necessary settlement.
During our brief visit, I was able to arrange an initial meeting be-
tween a leading official of the South African Government and an
influential Protestant minister, who told us that his congregation is
composed mainly of SWAPO supporters. These men, as I discovered
from talking with them separately, had more in common than they
seemed to realize. The administrator wanted to talk with the minister,
but was reluctant to make the first move. The churchman's first
reaction was to agree to a meeting only if it were held on "neutral"
ground and with a witness present. However, after persuading them
to speak together on the phone, the minister told me that the meeting
would be held privately in the official's office. Although the episode
has no great political significance, I felt that it revealed a need for
some person or institution to help bridge the gap between people on
both sides in Namibia who should be playing constructive roles in
shaping the country's future.
6. South Africa
In Capetown (April 22-23), we had an opportunity to meet with
Prime Minister Vorster, senior officials of the Department of Foreign
Affairs, and leaders of three parties reflecting a cross-section of the
all-white parliament. These parties are: The Nationalists, who hold
122 out of 171 seats; the United Party (36 seats), whose views are
somewhat less conservative on racial matters; and the Progressives
(12 seats), who might be considered near the middle of our own
We also met with a distinguished group of leaders of Capetown's
large "colored" (racially mixed) community. These people have been
disenfranchized because they were viewed by the Afrikaners as
potential allies of the "English-speaking" whites. (The Afrikaners,
who form a cohesive majority within the white minority, only gained
their present dominance after World War II.) Many colored people
have been forced to move from homes they have occupied for genera-
tions to make way for white developments. Colored people comprise
about half of Capetown's one million population.
We visited South Africa's National Nuclear Research Center at
Pelindaba. This is also the site of a nuclear enrichment plant, which
uses a process developed in South Africa. The director of the facility,
Dr. Aja Roux, said that South Africa is concerned about preserving
its proprietary right to the enrichment process because of the scarcity
of other energy sources in the country.
At the time of our visit, Prime Minister Vorster had just returned
from an official visit to Israel, which occasioned press speculation
about a possible armaments agreement between the two countries.
When we met a few days later, the Prime Minister emphatically
denied that there had been any such agreement. He said that the only
understandings his government had reached with Israel were of an
economic and commercial nature. I raised the subject of the Nuclear
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and pointed out that many nations would
be favorably impressed if South Africa signed this treaty. The Prime
Minister said that the subject would be reviewed intensively b} T his
government during the coming months.
Our meeting with Prime Minister Vorster was overshadowed by a
series of events which he unquestionably finds disturbing. First, the
victory of the Communist-supported MPLA forces in Angola, in spite
of military intervention by South Africa, proved that South Africa
cannot forcibly resist the growing pressures for black political power
in southern Africa. Second, the U.S. failure to veto a UN resolution on
Namibia, in March 1976, caused growing concern among white South
Africans. And third, Secretary Kissinger's omission of South Africa
from his itinerary — although he announced that he would deal with
regional problems — caused bitter comment in the South African press.
The Prime Minister began our conversation by saying he regarded
South Africa as part of the free world and the United States as his
leader — although, he added bluntly, he was not always sure where the
United States stood. I stated that the black African Presidents with
whom I had met acknowledged Mr. Vorster's role in trjdng to solve
the Rhodesian problem and reduce tensions between his country and
theirs. I asked about a press report I had seen that morning which
said he would not rule out supplying arms to Rhodesia. The Prime
Minister said this report was inaccurate, and that he had no intention
of aiding Ian Smith's government militarily. (Senior South African
officials have since made this point publicly.) However, he added that
it was against South Africa's policy to take part in an economic
Turning to Namibia, Mr. Vorster stated, in answer to my question,
that he had delegated full powers to the constitutional convention to
decide the future of that territory. I asked if he would permit represen-
tatives of SWAPO to take part in the conference, and he replied that
this was entirely up to the delegates at the conference. When I asked
if I could quote him publicly on this, he said I could — but added that
I should nlso make it clear that he personally had no use for SWAPO,
because in his opinion it was "born in sin" and organized "by
I asked if he was prepared to see Namibia become independent at
an early date, and he said he was if this was the will of the conference.
He pointed out, however, that the Warvis Bay enclave was indis-
putably part of South Africa and would remain so. And he implied
that there might have to be some hard bargaining over various assets
in the territory, such as railroads, that are owned by South Africa.
Our meeting with Prime Minister Vorster did nothing to change
my view that South Africa's racial policies are both irrational and
immoral in toda}~'s world. However, I was impressed by Mr. Vorster's
frankness and by his shrewd perception of his country's main foreign
policy interests. The test of his statesmanship may well be in whether
he seeks merely to shield South Africa from the winds of social
change — or whether he uses his many political assets to reorganize
South African society in ways that will help him continue to lead
his nation out of semi-isolation.
No one could possibly comprehend, in such a short stay, the com-
plexity of South Africa. This beautiful and deeply troubling country
is twice the size of Texas. But with the help of Ambassador William
Bowdler and the staff of the American Embassy, we did manage to
confer with a fascinating cross-section of the population, and we
listened to viewpoints as varied as one might find in the United States.
Afrikaners are fond of saying that South Africa and the United
States have much in common. In a sense this is true. Settlement by
Europeans of both countries began in the 1600's. The 19th century
saw major overland migrations. (The Afrikaners trekked north to
escape from English rule.) Afrikaners and Americans have each had
something of a love-hate relationship with the British, though the
Afrikaners gained control of South Africa only after World War II.
In both countries, whites have shamefully exploited blacks and killed
or driven out man}' aboriginal inhabitants. And finally, the material
culture of the two countries is often very similar — though the familiar
surface hides many deeply-rooted differences.
If the Afrikaners doubt that their racial policies are resented by
the black majority, they should listen to the people speak. I taped a
few of our conversations in Soweto — the enormous "township" of
1.5 million black people (it is located on the outskirts of Johannesburg,
where no black people are allowed to live). 1 We drove to Soweto
with an expert on South African affairs, whom I will call John. I
learned from him that workers who live in Soweto must spend a
fifth or more of their wages commuting back and forth to jobs in
Senator Percy. All we can see for miles are rows of identical small houses.
What is that large building over there?
John. That's called the Baragwanath Hospital. It serves the entire township
Senator Percy. Is it staffed b}* whites or blacks?
John. About eighty percent of the doctors are white, another 10 percent are
Indian, and the rest are Chinese and colored.
Senator Percy. No black doctors?
Senator Percy. Do you consider yourself colored or black?
John. Officially, I am colored, but 1 feel and consider myself black.
Senator Percy. How is a person's racial status determined?
John. It can be very complicated. They consider various physical features,
and sometimes the}* have to trace your genealogy.
Senator Percy. We met a group of colored leaders in Capetown, and it seemed
to me that they were schizophrenic about the matter of race. They're not with
the whites, but they are not with the blacks either. Their social status seems to
be considerably higher than the blacks, and they seem reluctant to fight the system
for that reason.
1 The worst rioting by South African blacks in many years began in June 1976 in
Soweto, where black high-school students objected to the required study of the Afrikaans
John. I can give some personal insight into this question of the colored. In my
family, my mother has six brothers and sisters, and they decided many j^ears ago
that they did not want to become part of the colored group. So they opted to be
white. At that stage you could, and we therefore are the onty ones — my mother
and mj' - five brothers and sisters — in my family who are "colored." As a matter
of fact, the others refused to have any sort of association with us because of their
Senator Percy. And the black and colored people don't associate politically?
John. A few j^ears ago, I thought that the colored people were ready to move
much faster toward the black group politically. But now I think we are in a process
where some of those people are beginning to move back toward this exclusive
colored thinking, because they do not want to lose the status they have at the
moment. It is very tragic. In fact, a number of my closest friends live right here in
Soweto. Yet I cannot enter So weto without getting a permit. We actually are visiting
Soweto quite illegally today; any non-black who enters Soweto has to have per-
mission from the local authorities to be here.
Senator Percy. We are going to visit a school — a high school just for black
students, isn't it?
John. Yes, about 825 students.
At the high school, I spoke with a teacher, who was black and a
graduate of the Uiiiversit}^ of South Africa.
Senator Percy. Does the government provide the same facilities for black,
white, and colored students?
Teacher. No, not at all the same. According to the Institute of Race Relations,
the government spends 154 Rand per year (about $175) on each white student, 56
Rand ($65) on every Indian and colored child, and 23 Rand ($26) on every black
child. For white children, nearly everything they need is provided — books, recrea-
tional facilities, etc. For Indians and colored children, the government at least
makes an effort to provide textbooks. For black children, the government only
pays the teachers' salaries (and at a much lower rate than white teachers). The
black students' families must not only pay for their books and all recreational
facilities, they must even pay for the upkeep of the school — even basic office
Senator Percy. We have just come from a very large white community, hun-
dreds of homes, each of which seemed to have a tennis court and swimming pool.
Do you have a swimming pool here at the school for the students?
Teacher [laughs]. I'm sure they would regard that as a luxury.
Senator Percy. Where would they swim if they wanted to swim?
Teacher. In the whole of Soweto, we have about one and a half million people,
and there are only two swimming pools for the people.
Senator Percy. What's your feeling, as a college graduate with a tremendous
responsibility for these young students, when you see the vast wealth in this
country that comes from gold mining, diamonds, and from the exploitation of
cheap labor. What's your feeling about that?
Teacher. Well, I think the terrible feeling that almost everybody has is
frustration, bitterness, and rejection of everything that is white. The whites don't
make any effort to share things with us. They want it all for themselves.
Senator Percy. What is your feeling about the way things are going in Rhodesia?
Teacher. Well, I would like to see black majorit}^ rule in Rhodesia. And once
it comes there, as it must come, I don't see how South Africa can escape that
Senator Percy. How about Namibia? Have you followed events up there?
Teacher. I think the constitutional conference is ji st a waste of time. I think
the sooner the government recognizes that SWAPO represents the aspirations
of the people, the better for everyone.
On a hill overlooking Soweto, we stopped to talk with a black
woman whom I will call Sarah.
Senator Percy. Would you describe the living conditions in this town?
Sarah. Well, every single house — I don't know how many thousands there
are — has exactly the same standard four rooms. The family that is assigned to
it pays something like a third of their wages for it — this is exhorbitantly high
considering how little most of them make.
Senator Percy. Can they own these homes?
Sarah. No. And out of a million and a half people, I would say just under a
thousand have been allowed to have long-term leases on the homes they live in.
Senator Percy. And what is this little park overlooking Soweto used for?
Sarah, (laughs) This is where they bring the white tourists who want to see
Soweto. See that tea shop over there? That and the restrooms are for whites
Later, I had this conversation with a lady I will call Mrs. Kaba,
who is married to a doctor.
Senator Percy. Are you working now yourself?
Mrs. Kaba. I was a teacher, but I resigned because I disagreed with the idea
of "Bantu education." The curriculum is designed to make it possible for black
people to operate only on the lowest rungs of society. I am in pain over this
inferior type of education designed to enforce an inferior status. Therefore, I
refuse to participate in it.
Senator Percy. You've done some work with the elderly, haven't you? What
does the government do for elderly poor people, and what do you do for them?
Mrs. Kaba. Our black elderly people get 8 Rand (about $10) every two months.
With that, they are supposed to pay the rent and clothe and feed themselves.
There are no old-age homes for black people in what the government calls "white
areas." Old people are supposed to return to their "homelands" and stay there
until they die.
If no one knows the homeland of an individual, he is sent to a "transit camp,"
where he is kept until someone decides which "homeland" is his. The conditions
in these camps is the most appalling I have ever seen — yet some elderly people
wait there for up to 3 years while the officials decide where to send them.
I decided that we must do something for these old people. So we raised money
(some of it in America), and we started a saving scheme. And we made arrange-
ments to give them some more nutricious food with the plain porridge they
receive in the camps.
Senator Percy. Doesn't it bother you a little bit that this country which is
richly endowed with a great deal of wealth can't afford to take care of its old
people or to educate the children — and they're not using the productive resources
of the black and colored populations fully?
Mrs. Kaba. This makes me absolute^ bitter. I know that one cannot achieve
many things in bitterness. But you cannot avoid it when you think that you have
the ability to work and earn a living like any other human being — but because
of job reservations, you are not allowed to work. And you are not allowed to
organize unions where you can bargain.
Senator Percy. What is your view of the "homelands" system? Do you live
in the place the government has designated as your homeland?
Mrs. Kaba. I want to make it very clear that the whole of South Africa is
my homeland! Any person who thinks I have a homeland somewhere tucked
away in a corner of South Africa is deceiving himself. Because I believe the whole
of South Africa is my home and it belongs to me. I am not driving anyone away
from South Africa, but we must share the whole country. This drawing of ethnic
"boundaries" is done artificially by the government to keep us separated. They
want to remain the rulers and not let us come together to bargain for our liberation.
Senator Percy. Do you have children, Mrs. Kaba? And if so, what is their
view of the opportunities for young black people in South Africa?
Mrs. Kaba. My daughter was a law student, but there was a strike at her
school and she was refused readmission and accused of being one of the ring-
leaders. Later, she managed to gain admission to the University of the North,
where she is studying now. My son, who was at the same university, has run
away from South Africa because of harassment by the police.
Senator Percy. Where is he living now?
Mrs. Kaba. He is in Botswana as a refugee. He's nineteen years old, and he has
only been gone for two weeks, and I have not heard from him yet.
Senator Percy. Will you write and tell me when you hear from him and how
he compares life in Botswana with life here in South Africa?
Mrs. Kaba. I certainly will. I think Botswana has proved a point. We are
always told we cannot govern ourselves. The independent countries like Botswana
have shown that we can do it without help from anyone. I have been in Botswana.
You feel the freedom as you land in the airport, and you feel sad to think how
little freedom we have in this oppressed country of ours.
(Note. — All the names of the people I interviewed have been
On April 23, I made a brief visit to Gaborone, the capital of
Botswana, meeting with Vice President Q.K.J. Masire. The American
Ambassador, David Bolen, was present at our meeting.
Botswana gained its independence in 1966, having been a High
Commission Territory under British protection prior to that time.
The parliamentary' system of government has served Botswana well
during its first decade of independence. The country enjoys political
stability, tranquility, and steady economic growth. Foreign invest-
ment is encouraged, and a substantial number of white expatriates
have remained in the country.
However, Botswana is unfortunately not isolated from the problems
of its neighbors. It is a land-locked country surrounded by Rhodesia,
South Africa, Namibia, and Zambia. The railway connecting Bulawayo
in Rhodesia with Mafeking, South Africa, is one of only two rail lines
that still link Rhodesia with the outside world. The other connects
Rhodesia and South Africa directly. The guerrilla war in the southern
part of Rhodesia has begun to escalate in intensity, and the railroads
have come under attack. President Khama has been carefulh* coordi-
nating the policy of his government with Presidents Nyerere and
Machel, and particularly with President Kaunda, his closest neighbor.
A substantial number of young nationalists from Namibia have also
sought refuge in Botswana.
In our meeting with Vice President Masire, he described Botswana's
internal policies and the tense political situation in the region. He
said that Botswana strongly favors an immediate political solution in
Rhodesia along the lines set forth by Prime Minister Callaghan, of
Great Britain. I indicated that the United States strongly supports
majority rule, and he said that his government would welcome any
efforts by the United States that would help to persuade the Ian Smith
regime to come to the negotiating table.
Turning to Namibia, I described my recent impressions of the
political situation in Windhoek and my conversation with Prime
Minister Vorster. Of all the frontline states, Botswana probably has
the most direct interest in achieving an early political solution in
Namibia because of its long common border with that territory.
Dr. Masire emphasized the need for South Africa to comply with
recent U.N. resolutions calling for independence and majority rule in
Namibia by 1977.
U.S. private investment in Botswana is so far very limited (book
value about $1 million). As already noted, the Government of
Botswana is doing everything possible to attract more foreign invest-
ment; depending on political developments in the region as a whole,
this could become an attractive country for U.S. enterprise. U.S.
economic aid to Botswana averages about $2 million per year, and is
primarily in the area of agricultural development. If President Khama
should decide to close his country's border to Rhodesia, as other
African countries have done, it is likely that he would look to the
United States and other Western nations for some form of offset aid.
In southern Africa, I support majority rule and racial justice as
the only sound basis on which to build stable societies. This is the
role our democratic heritage requires us to play. And it offers the
best hope of limiting violence and foreign military intervention in the
The most immediate source of instability in southern Africa is the
escalating guerrilla war in Rhodesia, which has been brought on by
Ian Smith's persistent refusal to negotiate seriously with the black
Rhodesians. The United States has committed itself to applying eco-
nomic sanctions against Rhodesia — and to assisting African govern-
ments that do so with offset aid — until Ian Smith agrees to a timetable
for majority rule along the lines proposed by Prime Minister Cal-
laghan of Great Britain last March.
Congress has now authorized a $75 million aid package for southern
Africa, none of which can be used for military operations acro.^s
international borders. During my trip to Africa, I reaffirmed my own
commitment to work for the repeal of the Byrd amendment, which
presently allows American firms to carry on a limited amount of
trade with Rhodesia. In his speech at Lusaka, Secretary Kissinger did
the same on behalf of the administration.
The practical effect of repealing the Byrd amendment would be to
cut off U.S. imports of chrome ore and ferrochrome from Rhodesia.
In recent years, the United States has imported annually:
Only about $1 million worth of chrome ore from Rhodesia (5
percent of our total chrome ore imports) ;
Some $2.5 million in low-carbon ferrochrome (15 percent of our
total imports) ; and
About $8.4 million worth of high-carbon ferrochrome (46 per-
cent of our total imports) .
There is no factual evidence for the argument — often made by sup-
porters of the Byrd amendment — that halting our very modest chrome
imports from Rhodesia would cause a corresponding rise in our de-
pendence on the Soviet Union. Indeed, our imports from the U.S.S.R.
actually increased after the Byrd amendment took effect. Moreover,
I was told b}^ South African officials when I visited their country —
one of the largest chrome producers — that the}^ would gladly make
up the difference if we halt our chrome imports from Rhodesia. Final^,
it is worth noting that our chrome stockpiles are several times greater
than would be needed to sustain us in a conventional war of one year's
duration. For all of these reasons, there is not a single executive
department or agenc}^ that claims that repealing the Byrd amendment
would be contrary to our national interest.
Ian Smith's regime has said that we are seeking to pacify a radical
black guerrilla movement by helping them drive out the white Rho-
desian settlers. This is not our aim. What we seek is a new constitu-
tional framework that recognizes the rights of the black majority
without sacrificing the rights of any minority, white or black. We
realize that it will not be easy to create such a framework. But we
believe the chances are better if black and white Rhodesians can begin
to negotiate seriously now, rather than wait until an escalating guer-
rilla war has moved them even further apart.
In Namibia, the political situation is somewhat like that in Rho-
desia, However, there is at least a potentially useful framework for
negotiations there in the form of a constitutional conference. This
urgently needs to be expanded to include the main political movements
and parties in Namibia. The Republic of South Africa should also cease
it< efforts to carve out separate ethnic "homelands" in Namibia and
treat the territory as one country. Moreover, it should agree to a
public timetable for Namibia's rapid transition to full independence
under majority rule. I have called for a more active U.S. role in pro-
moting negotiations aimed at full independence for Namibia, and I
fully support the objectives of Secretary Ki.-singer in meeting face to
face with Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa.
The leaders of South Africa and developing Africa have begun to
realize that they must greatly expand their economic links with each
other in order to attain their basic economic goals. They have no other
rational alternative. However, better relations between South Africa
and predominately black states depend on rapid and far-reaching
improvement of the situation of black people in the Republic.
The United States is one of the major investors in South Africa,
with over 350 U.S. firms represented there. American and other
business leaders whom I met in South Africa generally acknowledged
their responsibility to provide expanded opportunities for black South
Africans. Although U.S. firm- have been among the more progressive
employers in South Africa, they can do even better, and they must —
because the pentup pressures as 1 saw them are highly explosive. For
example, no black labor unions have yet been recognized as official
bargaining agents. Blacks have been the main victims of layoffs and
lling opportunities for advancement caused by the recession
(-till severe in South Africa), which has reversed some of their hard-
won economic gai] ver, low-income whites have also been
I y inflation, i in eat- of layoffs, and the pres>ure of the black
majority from below.
Under these circumstances, an embargo on further U.S. investment
in South Africa or a withdrawal of I .8 as some have suggested,
could prod form of violent upheaval. At the very least, a ban
on investment would aggravate the plight of the black majority with-
out offering these people any hope for constructive change. The best
our economic influence in Africa is that which Secretary Xis<in-
ger outlined during his recent tour: stronger pressure for positive
change in South Africa, coupled with increased public invest-
ment to help the developing nations of the continent become self-
rting. We have strong incentive- to cany out such a policy.
Africa ha- large reserves of raw materials on which we will increasingly
depend. Rising iivii irds in Africa mean new market- for U.S.
good-. And. as already noted, the emerging interdependence of the
states of southern Africa should offer some incentives for better race
relation- within national borders.
1. Excerpts from Speech by President Kenneth Kaunda of
Zambia, April 27, 1976 23
2. Excerpts from Speech by Secretary of State Henry A.
Kissinger, Lusaka, Zambia, April 27, 1976 24
3. Excerpts from U.S. Department of State publication,
"Background Notes, Namibia (South West Africa),"
December, 1974 27
4. Excerpts from Speech b}^ South African Foreign Mini
Hilgard Muller, at University of Stellenbosch, April 1,
5. Text of S. Res. 436 Ordered Reported by the Committee on
Foreign Relations, United States Senate, May 4, 1976___ 33
1. Excerpts from a Speech Delivered by Dr. Kenneth D. Kaunda, Presi-
dent of Zambia, at a Luncheon That He Gave in Honor of Secretary
Henry A. Kissinger, State House, Lusaka, April 27, 1976.
... In April last year I had the pleasure of meeting President Ford and yourself
during my visit to Washington D.C. We discussed the burning issue of peace and
war in our region. Southern Africa was a dynamite whose fuse was getting shorter
by the minute. An explosion was inevitable. It still is today unless someone
stops Smith's dangerous mania.
Today we have a man in our midst whose name is associated with crisis manage-
ment. It is, therefore, right for me on this occasion to restate that Southern Africa,
even after the independence of Angola and Mozambique, remains a real threat to
international peace and security. If you look at the world trouble spots today,
Southern Africa easily ranks first as a grave threat to world peace. The search for
a just and permanent solution is a priority of the first order.
We in Africa stated this very clearly in the Manifesto on Southern Africa in
1969. We reaffirmed this in 1975 in the Dar-es-Salaam Declaration. Africa, in
laying down its principles on Southern Africa, gave emphasis to the right of all
people — black, white and brown to build a future for themselves and their suc-
ceeding generations on the basis of equalitj r . Africa declared its desire to achieve
these objectives by peaceful means if this was possible. This was the first option.
We did not want to kill if this was avoidable. But we also emphasised that if it
was not possible to achieve majorit} r rule by peaceful means, then the oppressed
masses in Southern Africa had full right to take up arms to free themselves from
This is exactly what has happened. All avenues to majority rule by peaceful
means were closed to the people of Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Namibia.
They took up arms and we supported them. In Angola and Mozambique, nationalist
forces won resounding victories over colonial forces.
In the last eighteen months we the four frontline States, namely, Botswana,
Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia tried to explore the possibility of attaining
majority rule by peaceful means under the first option in the Manifesto on South-
ern Africa and the Dar-es-Salaam Declaration. We were genuine and very serious.
We wanted to avoid bloodshed. I wish to let you know, Mr. Secretary, that we
walked every inch of the road of peaceful strategy to majority rule; we left no
stone unturned, until we got to Cape Town and even met Mr. Vorster in the
process. We believe he was honest on Rhodesia. But even he as the last hope on
this road failed to achieve majority rule by peaceful means in Zambabwe. So we
exhausted that option.
There was therefore only one option left — it was the military option in accord-
ance with the decisions made by Africa earlier. The British Government rejects
military intervention, a move which would reduce the cost in life. So that leaves
guerrilla military action as the only option. Now we together with the six million
Zimbabweans are no longer walking on the road of peaceful change. Now Zimbab-
weans are on the war path. We support them as we did before. Just as we left no
stone unturned on our previous roads, we will leave no stone unturned in the march
to majority rule by armed struggle. Our commitment to intensified armed struggle
is as total as that which led us into discussions with Mr. Vorster. The war in Rho-
desia will not stop until Zimbabwe is born.
Therefore the answer to ending the war is very simple. Smith and his colleagues
must hand over power to the majority and then the war will end. This is America's
challenge now. The longer the war continues the more the prospects of a non-
racial society in Rhodesia are buried deep in the sands of the past. So those who are
prolonging the war by rejecting majoritA'" rule are at the same time destroying the
future of the white man in Rhodesia. Yet this is not [the] Africa's policy. This is
not the policy of Zimbabweans. The foundations for non-racialism are being de-
stroyed by Smith. Smith is bent on widening the scope of racial and ideological
confrontation so that big powers can get involved. America must refuse. Instead
he must be stopped. If no one else stops him, then the Zimbabweans will push him
out of their country.
The six million Zimbabweans are not willing agents of the current war. Smith
invited them to take up arms to liberate themselves. They have done so. The}- are
merely responding to an invitation. No decent and self-respecting African can re-
ject this invitation if it is the only way to end oppression and to achieve majority
In Namibia we seek full national independence for the entire territory of
Namibia. We seek respect for the territorial integrity of the full territory of
Namibia. We seek the right of SWAPO to take its place as the sole, legitimate
and authentic representative of the people of Namibia. We seek urgent declara-
tion by South Africa of an independence date and the acceleration of the process
towards that date. We are opposed to the Bantustanisation of Namibia.
Unless these conditions are met, we can expect a protracted war and in that
struggle, we will remain on the side of justice. The side of justice is the side of
SWAPO and the struggling masses. They deserve our unqualified support and we
will give it as we have done in the past.
The Security Council Resolution in January this year on Namibia is the most
constructive yet. Its effective implementation would end the war in Namibia.
The South African Government has claimed that it has no interest in any part of
Namibia. We must, therefore, call upon them to name the date for independence,
to organize free elections under international supervision, end repression in any
shape or form and to free all the political detainees and prisoners. This will end
the war and turn the armed struggle into a normal democratic political process.
If we want peace, let us work for peace and not create conditions for armed
In South Africa itself we continue to seek an end to apartheid. This is an evil
and inhuman system which the world must continue to condemn and oppose
until it is destroyed. The continuation of apartheid exacerbates the crisis in South-
ern Africa for it gives no hope whatsoever to the millions of the oppressed to
achieve freedom and equality based on justice. Apartheid is a cancer which is
bound to kill the South African society. It leaves no option for the majority of
non-whites but to cast their lot with those who are willing to lay down their lives
in order to be free. . . .
2. Excerpts From Speech by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger at a
Luncheon in his Honor Hosted by President Kenneth Kaunda, Lusaka,
Zambia, April 27, 1976.
. . . The U.S. position on Rhodesia is clear and unmistakable. As President
Ford has said, "The United States is totally dedicated to seeing to it that the
majority becomes the ruling power in Rhodesia." We do not recognize the Rho-
desian minority regime. The United States voted for, and is committed to, the
L.N. Security Council resolutions of 1966 and 1968 that imposed mandatory
economic sanctions against the illegal Rhodosian regime. Earlier this year we
cospoiwored a Security Council resolution, which was passed unanimously, expand-
ing mandatory sanctions. And in March of this year we joined with others to
commend Mozambique for its decision to enforce these sanctions even at great
economic cost to itself.
It is the responsibility of all who seek a negotiated solution to make clear to the
Rhode^i-m minority that the world community is united in its insistence on rapid
change. It is the responsibility of those in Rhodesia who believe in peace to take
the stops necessary to avert a great tragedy.
US. policy for a just and durable Rhodesian solution will therefore rest on ten
First, the United States declares its support in the strongest terms for the
proposals made by British Prime Minister (James) Callaghan on March 22 of
ibis year — that independence must lie precded by majority rule which, in turn,
must be achieved no later than two years following the expeditious conclusion
<>f negotiations. We consider these proposals a basis for a settlement fair to all the
people of Rhodesia. We urge that they be accepted.
>nd, the Salisbury regime must understand that it cannot expect U.S. sup-
port either in diplomacy or in material help at any stage in its conflict with African
states or African liberation movements. On the contrary it will face our unrelenting
opposition until a negotiated settlement is achieved.
Third, the United States will take steps to fulfill completely its obligation under
international law to mandatory economic sanctions against Rhodesia. We will
urge the Congress this year to repeal the Byrd Amendment — which authorizes
Rhodesian chrome imports to the United States — an act inconsistent with U.N.
sanctions. In parallel with this effort we will approach other industrial nations
to insure the strictest and broadest international compliance with sanctions.
Fourth, to insure that there are no misperceptions on the part of the leaders of
the minority in Rhodesia, the United States, on the conclusion of my consultations
in black Africa, will communicate clearly and directly to the Salisbury regime
our view of the urgency of a rapid negotiated settlement leading to majority rule.
Fifth, the U.S. Government will carry out its responsibility to inform American
citizens that we have no official representation in Rhodesia nor any means of
providing them with assistance or protection. American travelers will be advised
against entering Rhodesia; Americans resident there will be urged to leave.
Sixth, as in the case of Zambia a few years ago, steps should be taken — in
accordance with the recent U.N. Securit}' Council resolution — to assist Mozam-
bique, whose closing of its borders with Rhodesia to enforce sanctions has imposed
upon it a great additional economic hardship. In accordance with this U.N.
resolution, the United States is willing to provide $12.5 million of assistance.
Seventh, the United States — together with other members of the United Na-
tions — is ready to help alleviate economic hardship for any countries neighboring
Rhodesia which decide to enforce sanctions by closing their frontiers.
Eighth, humanitarian provision must be made for the thousands of refugees
who have fled in distress from Rhodesia into neighboring countries. The United
States will consider sympathetically requests for assistance for these refugees by
the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees or other appropriate international
Ninth, the world community should give its support to the people in Rhodesia
as they make the peaceful transition to majority rule and independence and should
aid a newly independent Zimbabwe. To this end, we are ready to join with other
interested nations in a program of economic, technical, and educational assistance
to enable an independent Zimbabwe to achieve the progress and the place in the
community of nations to which its resources and the talents of all its people
Finally, we state our conviction that whites as well as blacks should have a
secure future and civil rights in a Zimbabwe that has achieved racial justice. A
constitutional structure should protect minority rights together with establishing
majority rule. We are prepared to devote some of our assistance programs to this
In carrying out this program we shall consult closely with the Presidents of
Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia.
We believe these are important measures. We are openminded with respect to
additional actions that can help speed a resolution. The United States will consult
closely with African leaders, especially the four Presidents, and with other
friends on the Rhodesian problem. For the central fact that I have come here to
stress is this: The United States is wholly committed to help bring about a rapid,
just, and African solution to the issue of Rhodesia.
Rhodesia is the most urgent but by no means the only critical problem in
southern Africa. The status of Namibia has been a source of contention between
the world community and South Africa for over three decades.
The territory of South-West Africa turned into a source of serious international
discord following World War II. When the United Nations refused to accede to
South Africa's proposal for annexation of the territory, South Africa declined to
enter into a trusteeship agreement and since then has refused to recognize the
United Nations as the legal sovereign. In 1956 the General Assembly terminated
South Africa's mandate over the territory. In 1971 the International Court of
Justice concluded that South Africa's occupation of Namibia was illegal and that it
The United States voted for the 1966 General Assembly resolution. We were
the only major power to argue before the International Court that South African
occupation was illegal. And in January 1 976 the United States voted in favor of the
U.N. resolution condemning the occupation of Namibia and calling for South
Africa to take specific steps toward Namibia's self-determination and independ< snce.
We are encouraged by the South African Government's evident decision to move
Namibia toward independence. We are convinced that a solution can be found
which will embody equal rights for the entire population and at the same time
protect the interests of all who live and work there. But we are concerned thai
South Africa has failed to announce a definite timetable for the achievement of
self-determination, that all the people and all political groupings of Namibia
have not been allowed to take part in determining the form of government they
shall one day have, and that South Africa continues to deny the United Nations
its proper role in establishing a free and independent Namibia.
Therefore, the United States position is as follows:
We reiterate our call upon the South African Government to permit all the
people and groups of Namibia to express their views freely, under U.N. super-
vision, on the political future and constitutional structure of their country.
We urge the South African Government to announce a definite timetable
acceptable to the world community for the achievement of self determination.
The United States is prepared to work with the international community, and
especially with African leaders, to determine what further steps would improve
prospects for a rapid and acceptable transition to Namibian independence. We
are convinced that the need for progress is urgent.
Once concrete movement toward self-determination is underway, the United
States will ease its restrictions on trade and investment in Namibia. We stand
ready to provide economic and technical assistance to help Namibia take its
rightful place among the independent nations of the world.
Apartheid in South Africa remains an issue of great concern to those committed
to racial justice and human dignity.
No country, no people can claim perfection in the realm of human rights. We in
America are aware of our own imperfections. But because we are a free society,
our problems and our shortcomings are fully aired and made known to the world.
And we have reason to take pride in our progress in the quest for justice for all
in our country. The world communitj^'s concern with South Africa is not merely
that racial discrimination exists there. What is unique is the extent to which
racial discrimination has been institutionalized, enshrined in law, and made all-
No one — including the leaders of black Africa — challenges the right of white
South Africans to live in their country. They are not colonialists; historically,
they are an African people. But white South Africans must recognize as well
that the world will continue to insist that the institutionalized separation of the
races must end. The United States appeals to South Africa to heed the warning
signals of the past two years. There is still time to bring about a reconciliation of
South Africa's peoples for the benefit of all. But there is a limit to that time — a
limit of far shorter duration than was generally perceived even a few j^ears ago.
A peaceful end to institutionalized inequality is in the interest of all South
Africans. The United States will continue to encourage and work for peaceful
change. Our policy toward South Africa is based upon the premise that within a
reasonable time we shall see a clear evolution toward equality of opportunity and
basic human rights for all South Africans. The United States will exercise all its
efforts in that direction. We urge the Government of South Africa to make that
premise a reality.
In the immediate future the Republic of South Africa can show its dedication
to Africa — and its potential contribution to Africa — by using its influence in
Salisbury to promote a rapid negotiated settlement for majority rule in Rhodesia.
This, we are sure, would be viewed positively by the community of nations, as well
as by the rest of Africa ....
For Namibia and Zimbabwe training programs should be intensified now so that
needed manpower will be ready when majority rule is attained. Existing programs
to train Namibian and Zimbabwean refugees as administrators and technicians
should be expanded as rapidly as possible. We have requested additional funds
from Congress for this purpose. We urge other donors and international organiza-
tions to do more.
Development for all of southern Africa involves a process of transforming rural
life. We are prepared to assist in agricultural development, in health programs,
in manpower training, in improving rural transportation — through both bilateral
and multilateral programs.
A revolution in development planning could be achieved by the use of satellites
to eollect vital information on crops, weather, water resources, land use, and
mineral exploration. The United States has already shared with developing
nations information from our earliest Earth resources survey satellites. We are
now prepared to undertake much larger programs to apply this technology to
Africa — including training programs and the development of training facilities
and satellite receiving stations in Africa itself.
Perhaps the most critical long-term economic need of southern Africa is : a
modern system of regional transportation. The magnitude of the effort extends
beyond the capacity of any one nation or group of nations. For this reason the
United States proposes that the World Bank undertake as a priority matter the
organization of a multilateral consultative group of donors to develop a modern
regional transportation system for southern Africa. For our part we promise our
full cooperation in working out a long-term program and in financing appropriate
portions of it.
And finally, I can announce today that we expect to triple our support for
development programs in southern and central Africa over the next three
years. . . .
3. Excerpts From U.S. Department of State Publication, "Background
Notes, Namibia (South West Africa)," December, 1974, Summarizing
the History op the Territory and U.S. Policy in Regard to It.
It is generally assumed that the Bushmen were the earliest inhabitants of the
region now known as Namibia. Later inhabitants include the Nama and a Negroid
race known as the Damara, or Berg Dama. The Bantu-speaking Ovambo and
Herero migrated from the north. The first Europeans to land on the shores of
the territory were loth century Portuguese seafarers.
The inhospitable Namib Desert constituted a formidable harrier to any ex-
plorations into the interior until the late 18th century. During the 19th century
a succession of travelers, traders, hunters, and missionaries (mostly British and
Cape Dutch in origin) explored the area. In 1878 the United Kingdom annexed
Walvis Bay on behalf of Cape Colony, and the area was incorporated into the
Cape of Good Hope in 1884. In 1883 a German trader claimed the rest of the
coastal region from the Orange River to the 26th degree latitude after negotiations
with a local chief. Diplomatic negotiations between the United Kingdom and
Germany ended in Germany's annexation of the coastal region except for Walvis
Bay. The following j^ear the United Kingdom recognized the hinterland up to
the 20th degree longitude as a German sphere of influence.
German administration effectively ended during World War I when the terri-
tory was occupied by South African forces. Later Germany ceded rights to all
its former colonies to the principal Allied and Associated Powers under Article
119 of the Treaty of Versailles. Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Na-
tions gave international status to these former colonies.
On December 17, 1920, South Africa undertook the administration of South
West Africa under the terms of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of
Nations and a mandate agreement confirmed by the League Council. It accepted
the principle set forth in the covenant that the well-being and development of
the people formed a sacred trust of civilization. The mandate agreement gave
South Africa full power of administration and legislation over the territory as an
integral portion of South Africa and required that South Africa promote to the
utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the people.
The agreement contained other safeguards, including provision for reporting to
the League and for international judicial resolution of disputes.
When the League of Nations was dissolved in 1946, its supervisory authority
for the territory was inherited by the newly formed United Nation-. This auti
Was at least implicitly recognized b\~ South Africa when in 1946 it requested the
U.N. General Assembly's permission to annex the territory. The Assembly
rejected South Africa's request on the grounds that the indigenous population
was not sufficiently advanced to decide its future political status. South Africa
refused U.N. requests to place the territory under a trusteeship agreement,
arguing that the United Nations was not an automatic successor to the responsi-
bilities of the League of Nations.
In 1950 the United Nations asked the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
for an advisory opinion on the status of South West Africa. The ICJ held that,
notwithstanding the dissolution of the League of Nations, the international
status of the territory and South Africa's obligations under the mandate agree-
ment continued in effect with the General Assembly maintaining the authority
to exercise international supervision. The ICJ also held that although South
Africa was not obliged to enter a trusteeship agreement, it could not unilaterally
modify the international status of the territory.
During the 1950's various U.N. initiatives failed to resolve the differences be-
tween the United Nations and South Africa, although the General Assembly
passed numerous resolutions to the effect that South Africa was obligated to put
the territory under U.N. trusteeship.
In 1960 Ethiopia and Liberia took to the ICJ the question of whether South
Africa was in breach of its obligations under the U.N. mandate and covenant by
failing to report to the United Nations and by other conduct respecting the sacred
trust. In 1962 the ICJ decided that it had jurisdiction by virtue of the U.N.
mandate's provision for judicial resolution of disputes. In 1966, however, on com-
pletion of the argument on the merits, the ICJ held that it could not decide the
matter because Ethiopia and Liberia lacked the requisite legal interest entitling
them to such a determination. In the U.S. view the 1966 judgment did not di-
minish the validity of the ICJ's earlier advisory opinions affirming South West
Africa's international status and the U.N.'s supervisory authority.
On October 27, 1966, the U.N. General Assembly decided in resolution 2145
(XXI), which the United States supported, that South Africa's mandate was
terminated and that the territory henceforth would come under the direct re-
sponsibility of the United Nations. The basis for the Assemblj-'s decision was its
conclusion that South Africa had failed to fulfill its obligations under the mandate
agreement and had, in effect, disavowed that mandate.
The period since 1966 has been one of increasingly sharp division between the
positions of the United Nations and South Africa. The South African Government
disregarded U.N. Resolution 2145 asserting that the United Nations had no right
to terminate unilaterally its authority to administer South West Africa. The U.N.
( reneral Assembly established a Council for South West Africa in 1967 to take over
the administration of the territory. The United States abstained on the resolution
establishing the Council on the grounds that the terms of reference of the Council
were unworkable in view r of South Africa's refusal to remove its administration
from the territory. The United States also declined to serve on the 11-member
Council (increased to 18 members in 1972). In subsequent resolutions the U.N.
( reneral Assembly called for South Africa's immediate withdrawal from South
West Africa and in 1968 renamed the territory Namibia after the Namib Desert.
That same year the matter of South Africa's mandate over Namibia was first
taken to the U.N. Security Council which, in successive resolutions supported
General Assembly Resolution 2145 and called for South Africa's withdrawal from
Namibia. In particular, the Security Council in Resolution 276 (1970), which the
United States supported, declared that South Africa's presence in Namibia is il-
legal since the passage of General Assembly Resolution 2145. Security Council
Resolution 276 also called on states to deal with South Africa in ways consistent
with the illegality of its presence and acts in the territory and established an ad hoc
Subcommittee of the Council for Namibia to study and recommend ways of ef-
fectively implementing the Security Council's resolutions.
On July 20, 1970, the Security Council, on the recommendation of its subcom-
mittee, adopted Resolutions 283 and 284. The first called on states to act in ways
consistent with the illegality of South Africa's presence and administration, in-
cluding taking steps to discourage foreign investment in Namibia. The second re-
ferred to the 1 ICJ for an advisory opinion the question of the legal consequences of
South Africa's continued presence in Namibia, notwithstanding Security Council
In the proceedings before the ICJ the United States submitted written and oral
statements setting forth the legal considerations underlying its view that South
Africa's rights in Namibia had terminated with certain legal consequences for South
Africa. On June 21, 1971, the ICJ rendered its advisory opinion, stating its con-
clusions in the following terms:
"133 ... (1) that, the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia being
illegal, South Africa is under obligation to withdraw its administration from
Namibia immediately and thus put an end to its occupation of the Territory;
"(2) that States Members of the United Nations are under obligation to
recognize the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia and the invalidity
of its acts on behalf of or concerning Namibia, and to refrain from any acts and
in particular any dealings with the Government of South Africa implying recogni-
tion of the legality of, or lending support or assistance to, such presence and
"(3) that it is incumbent upon States which are not Members of the United
Nations to give assistance, within the scope of subparagraph (2) above, in the
action which has been taken by the United Nations with regard to Namibia."
By Security Council Resolution 301 (1971) the Security Council endorsed
these conclusions, which had also been accepted by the United States. South
Africa refused to accept this ICJ advisory opinion just as it had disregarded
earlier General Assembly and Security Council resolutions.
On February 4, 1972, the Security Council passed two further resolutions.
Resolution 309 invited the Secretary General to initiate contacts with all parties
concerned with a view to establishing the necessary conditions to enable the
people of Namibia to exercise their right to self-determination and independence.
Resolution 310 called on all states to insure that their nations and corporations
operating in Namibia conform their hiring policies to the basic provisions of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The United States voted for both
As requested by Resolution 309 the Secretary General visited South Africa
and Namibia in March 1972 and held discussions with South African Government
officials and representatives of various groups and parties in Namibia. The
Secretary General's personal representative, Dr. Escher of Switzerland, made a
more extended visit to South Africa and Namibia during October-November
1972 for further discussions. Meetings between the Secretary General and South
African Government officials were also held during the period December 1972-
April 1973. These discussions were productive to the extent of eliciting South
African Government policy statements on Namibia's future. The South African
Fdreign Minister stated that his government: (a) would fully respect the wishes
of the whole population regarding future constitutional organization of South
West Africa and would impose no constitutional system; (b) would permit
all political parties to participate fully and freely in the process leading to self-
determination and independence; (c) would not delay the act of self-determination
and would cooperate with the Secretary General and consult with the people to
determine measures to insure the achievement of self-determination; (d) did not
envisage individual population groups becoming suddenly independent as separate
entities; and (e) anticipated that it might not take longer than 10 years for the
population to be ready to exercise its right to self-determination.
The Secretary General, however, concluded that these statements did not
provide the complete and unequivocal clarification of South Africa's policy re-
garding self-determination and independence for Namibia required by the Secu-
rity Council. On the basis of the Secretary General's report and a wave of South
African-instigated repression in Namibia later in the year, the Security Council
in December 1973 formally terminated the Secretary General's mandate under
Frustrated by the lack of progress in implementing U.N. decisions regarding
Namibia, opponents of South African rule held political rallies and demonstra-
tions, mainly in Ovamboland and in the Windhoek area. Many oppositionists
were detained for long periods, some imprisoned and some publicly flogged by
tribal authorities in Ovamboland. During the period June-October 1974 an esti-
mated 3,000 persons, mainly young, educated Ovambos, fled Namibia because
of repressive political conditions in Ovamboland and rumors of educational
opportunities in Zambia. On September 23, 1974, the ruling National Party of
South West Africa decided that the various "population groups" (i.e. white,
colored, and black tribal groups) should select leaders who would come together
to discuss Namibia's future pattern of constitutional development. The South
African Ambassador to the U.N. stated in October that the people of Namibia
may be ready to exercise their right to self-determination "considerably sooner"
than the 10-year prediction made by the Foreign Minister in 1973. . . .
United States- Namibia relations
In keeping with its support of U.N. resolutions and International Court of
Justice advisory opinions regarding Namibia, the U.S. Government believes that
the South African Government should promptly comply with applicable U.N.
resolutions by ending its illegal administration of Namibia and recognizing the
authority of the United Nations over the territory. It advocates a resolution of
the Namibian problem by peaceful means and supports practical efforts to enable
the people of Namibia to exercise their right to self-determination and
The U.S. Government seeks to promote and protect the human rights of the
Namibian people. It follows developments in the territory closely and expresses
to the South African Government its deep concern over South African violations
of the rights and well-being of the people.
Since May 1970 the U.S. Government has officially discouraged American
investment in Namibia. It has announced that investment rights acquired through
the South African Government following the termination of the mandate in 1966
will not be protected against the claims of a future lawful government in the
territory. Export-Import Bank guarantees and other facilities are not available
for trade with Namibia. In support of U.N. Security Council Resolution 310
(1972), U.S. firms doing business in the territory have been urged to seek to
conform their employment practices to the Universal Declaration of Human
The United States maintains no permanent diplomatic or consular representa-
tion in Namibia. American Embassy officials stationed in South Africa make
short periodic visits to the territory to inquire into the well-being of the people
and to observe political, economic, social, and legal developments.
In view of South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia, the United States has
provided no economic assistance to the territory and does not have Peace Corps
or U.S. Information Service (USIS) programs there. However, in 1974 the United
States contributed $50,000 to the U.N. Fund for Namibia. . . .
4. Excerpts From a Speech by the South African Foreign Minister, Dr.
HlLGARD MULLER, AT THE UNIVERSITY OF StELLENBOSCH, APRIL 1. 1976,
Containing a Detailed Statement of the South African Government's
Policy in Regard to Namibia (South West Africa).
. . . Nobody can deny that South Africa and South West Africa have close ties
in many fields. In this close association, whieh has developed over maiw decades,
the South African Railways, Harbours, Airways, Posts and Telecommunications
and the provision of technical and scientific expertise have all played a notable
part. In these areas, South West Africa and its people can depend upon South
African support and co-operation to resolve their particular problems in the
most effective manner, and this will continue into the future.
I would like to state clearly and emphatically that South Africa receives no
financial or economic gain whatever from its presence in South West Africa,
nor does it intend to reap any such gain from the Territory in the future. As far
as the present situation is concerned, I would point out that ever}' cent of tax
on income derived in the Territory, including returns on external investments
and undertakings, is re-invested in the Territory for the benefit of all its inhabit-
ants. In this connection it is pertinent to mention that the South African tax-
pavers have in past years contributed considerably to the administration and
the advancement of the Territory. South Africa realizes that its resources are
not inexhaustible and that it bears a great responsibility towards its own people
who are also experiencing a growing need for development funds. In spite of this,
the Government makes this contribution to South West Africa's development
in the sincere belief that it is our duty to do so. It is South Africa's earnest wish
to reinforce still further the links which it has forged with this neighbouring
territory not only to the advantage of the South West African people, but also
in the interests of all the States of Southern Africa which have so much in com-
mon. The accusations of economic imperialism leveled against South Africa are
completely untenable in the light of these facts and of the real state of affairs.
South Africa's record since 1920 shows the very antithesis of economic
imperialism. . . .
South Africa respects the right of self-determination of the South West African
peoples. There can be no interference with that right, either now or in the future.
Therefore South Africa offers them the opportunity to acquire the necessary
experience in self-government, so that they will be better able to decide what is in
their best interests and in what political direction they would like South West
Africa to move. As they move towards the moment of decision, all options are
open to them. . . .
. . . South Africa's only desire in this regard — a desire which should be shared
by all those who really have the Territory's interests at heart — is that the in-
habitants should reach unanimity about their political future freel}-, voluntarily,
and as quickly as possible.
This is the chief requirement of the Government. It is not for us to decide what
the end product should look like. Although my theme this evening is the future of
South West Africa, I do not propose to yield to the temptation to speculate about
the possible form and content of such a constitutional solution. Suffice it for me to
emphasize that it is South Africa's firm intention to continue in the meantime the
work of development in which we are engaged. We shall also continue to protect
the northern frontier of the Terrritory, and to maintain law and order so as to
provide the leaders of South West Africa's population groups with the opportunity
to fulfill their task in a peaceful atmosphere in which with a sense of purpose and
mutual understanding and trust they can work together to determine the political
future of their fatherland. South Africa considers it to be of vital importance for
the people of South West Africa that the solutions to their problems should be
sought in their own ranks without any form of disruption, whatever it may be.
The process, which will eventually lead to the new political dispensation for
South West Africa, is already seven months in train. The Constitutional Con-
ference in Windhoek had to surmount many obstacles before it could be convened
last September. All the leaders, white as well as non-white, who took the initiative
and carried out the work of preparation deserve the highest praise and gratitude.
Many observers, especially the critics overseas, were originally highly sceptical
about the Conference. Xow, after the representatives of the different population
groups have completed three sessions; after four committees of the Conference
have made intensive studies of economic and social questions and have prepared
reports on these; after these reports have already been accepted by the Con-
ference — now we find that some of these critics are no longer so ready to write off
the Conference in summary fashion. On the contrary, more and more of them are
now even prepared to give the representatives a chance to determine for them-
selves the constitutional future of their own country. Thus Mr. Schaufele, the
American Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, acknowledged on the
19th of March that the Conference was a positive step, although he added that
its progress was too slow and that in his opinion it was not representative of the
people of South West Africa.
It is self-evident that this exercise in shaping the future cannot proceed too
fast. The Constitutional Conference recognised the importance of this considera-
tion during its first session in September 1975 when it drew up a Declaration of
Intent. Mr. Mudge has no doubt already given you full information in this regard.
When the Constitutional Conference has achieved its objective of drafting a
constitution for South West Africa, it stands to reason that this document,
representing the unanimous views of the delegates in the Turnhalle in Windhoek
will clearly have to be submitted to the inhabitants of the Territory. How exactly
thjs will be done, and what procedure will be followed to give the inhabitants of
South West Africa the opportunity to express their approval or disapproval has
still to be decided. Because the representatives are continually in touch with
their people and are keeping them informed about progress in the Conference,
the various population groups will to a large extent be conversant with the
constitutional proposals of the Conference when these reach finali*
In the process of finding a >. and acceptable solution for South West
Africa'- political future, there is nothing to prevent anyone from submitting
constitutional proposals in a peaceable manner and from maintaining majority
support for such proposals. The only requirement — and it is not a requirement
laid down by South Africa alone, but' one which has also been pertinently put and
insisted upon by" the South West African people themselves — is that constitu-
tional and political development in the Territory must take place in a peaceful
manner. . . .
No country can afford a bloodletting. The Territory has seen the shedding of
blood in former years. Why must it happen again? The people of South Y\ est
Africa are now firmly resolved to determine their future in a peaceful manner.
The achievement of T :.:~ ] n is< \ rthy objective to go forward to independence by
way of peaceful evolution, stands in stark contrast to the bloody civil war and
chaos which we have witnessed in Angola recently. South Africa cannot and will
not permit such a situation to develop in South West Africa and it calls upon the
internatii mal c immu rive also to ensure that such tragic events should not
be repeated in - r Africa.
As I have already said, I do not wish to speculate about the form of the f -
constitution of - Id be interpreted as an attempt to
interfere with or to influence the Conference, and that would be in conflict with
the Government's policy.
However, there is a matter about which I would like to leave some thoughts
in your minds, and that is the particular framework within which the States of
Southern Africa find themselves, and this applies also to South West Africa bj^
reason of its geographical situation and other realities. Among the majority of
States of the sub-continent there exists a very real necessity — as a consequence
of their position, bound together by geography and destiny — to work together
in association so as to ensure the development and the prosperity of the region
as a whole. Where co-operation already takes place care is taken, not only that
shared problems should be discussed and thus more effectively overcome, but
also that the opportunity be offered to all concerned to do so with a better and a
deeper understanding of each other. Since South West Africa will take its place
in this group of States, it must be accepted that the Territory will make its
contribution to the fulfillment of the common aspirations of those States — and I
trust that it will feel called upon to do so.
In this context, I would refer you to the existing customs union and the monetary
agreement between South Africa and some of its neighbor States, and the possi-
bilities which this type of arrangement holds for other countries. Other spheres
in which the States of Southern Africa constantly support one another and where
liaison is continually taking place, are energy supplies, employment opportunities,
harbour facilities, and rail, road, and air transport. Apart from this economic
co-operation, there is also substantial regional co-operation in the technical
and scientific field, which covers a particularly wide range. By this means the
necessary infrastructure of these States is built up and expanded. Attention is
being given, for example, to tourism where the Regional Tourism Council
(SARTOC) makes a valuable contribution to the development of an industry
which is of great importance to each of the Member States, because each of them
has a considerable potential which can be developed and expanded. Then there
is also the Southern African Regional Commission for the Conservation and
utilisation of the soil (SARCCUS). This regional organisation is of incalculable
value for its members. The organisation's activities cover a particularly wide
field of which the control and elimination of erosion, and the conservation, pro-
tection, improvement and productive use of the soil are the most important
It is unthinkable that an independent South West Africa would not associate
itself with the States of Southern Africa, to which it is linked geographically and
in other ways, and co-operate in these various fields as well as in other fields of
activity. By doing so, when the opportunity arises, South West Africa will ensure
that the country and the people will share in the advantages which flow from
working together on a regional basis.
I am convinced that an independent South West Africa — just like other States
in Southern Africa — will be realistic in its conduct and will choose the road which
will lead to the prosperity of its people as well as that of the entire region. In this
way the ranks of the independent States will be augmented — the Transkei and
other Homelands will, I hope, also be added in due course. I believe that this will
develop into a bloc in which the members will complement and support one
another in different spheres so that the advantages flowing from this association
will operate for each State separately and for the region as a whole, thus providing
an incentive for yet closer co-operation. By vigorous economic and other collab-
oration and progress, which can lead to the establishment of a constellation of
States in Southern Africa, political stability can be assured in the whole sub-
continent. It is hardly conceivable that South West Africa would wish or be able
to remain out of the customs union, the monetary agreement, and our transport
network, including the harbours.
After all that I and other speakers have said about South West Africa during
this Autumn School, the question may be justifiably put to me: when will the
peoples of South West Africa attain full self-determination? Cannot a date be
This too is a matter which in the final analysis depends upon those peoples
themselves, and especially on their representative at the Constitutional Con-
ference. It goes without saying that the Government will continue to do all in its
power to encourage the members of the Convention to reach agreement on their
political future in as short a time as possible. But, however earnestly we wish to
<(•(• an early solution, it is not for South Africa nor for the United Nations, nor
for any other outsider to decide at what pace their deliberations should move.
Nevertheless, I would point out that the progress already made in this regard is
encouraging and substantial. . . .
I have already mentioned that on 12 September of last year the Conference
expressed its intention of drafting a constitution for South West Africa as soon as
it could and, if possible, within three years — that is to say two and a half years
The quicker they can do this, the better it will be for all involved. And as soon
as they come up with a constitution acceptable to all concerned, the Government,
for its part, will not delay matters or stand in their way. On the contrary, together
with them it will immediately proceed to the practical implementation of their
wishes. . . .
5. Text of S. Res. 436, U.S. Policy Toward Africa, Supporting the Africa
Policy Statement by Secretary Kissinger at Lusaka, April 27, 1976.
The Resolution was Introduced by Senator Percy and Cosponsored by
Senators Clark, Case, Javits, Scott (of Pennsylvania), McGee, Pear-
son, Pell, Mc Govern, Hathaway, Kennedy, Tunney, Biden, and Brooke.
It Was Ordered Reported Without Objection by the Committee on-
Foreign Relations on May 4, 1976
Whereas Secretary Kissinger's speech in Lusaka, Zambia, April 27, 1976,
signals a new realism in United States policy toward Africa ;
Whereas the Secretarj-'s speech takes account of the strong desire of Africans —
and Americans — across the political spectrum that there be "no more Angolas",
meaning no more East- West confrontation in Africa;
Whereas the Secretary has morally committed the United States to a number of
positive actions aimed at bringing about majority rule — with protection of the
rights of all peoples — in Rhodesia and Namibia;
Whereas the Senate shares the Secretan-'s concern that refusal by the Ian
Smith regime to negotiate sincerely could open the way for outside intervention
in Rhodesia with greater violence and bloodshed; and
Whereas the Senate supports the Secretary's conclusion that the best policy
for the United States is to demonstrate constructive United States support of
majority rule: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, that the Senate strongly supports the basic principles and positions
which Secretary Henry Kissinger expounded in his address at Lusaka, Zambia,
on April 27, 1976, and is prepared to work closely with the Secretary in implement-
ing this new policy toward Africa.
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
3 1262 09113 1556